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INTRODUCTION 
World food markets seem to be largely determined by the pro- 
duction and consumption patterns of some 20 countries. Moreover, 
inspection of these patterns in recent years suggests that there are 
only about half a dozen of these that account for most of the 
world's exports. In such a situation, where markets are determined 
by relatively few actors, output and trade may be subject to 
strategic manipulation. The problem is to determine what effects 
such behaviour may have on total food production and prices, since 
this has profound implications for food-short nations. Here we 
briefly suggest certain behavioral phenomena that one might look 
for in such a situation and briefly outline some game theoretic 
models to analyze such behaviour. 
Some of the questions that might be treated are these: 
o in a competitive market would the major producing countries 
be likely to produce less than is warranted by their costs 
of production? 
o what kind of collusive agreements could form between pro- 
ducers, or between producers and consumers, and what is the 
effect on production and prices? 
o what are the effects of certain strategic choices on the 
evolution of different countries' positions in food versus 
non-food production? 
To answer such questions we propose the following three-part 
modelling sequence : 
simple oligopoly model 
general equilibrium model with several sectors 
multiperiod investment model with effects on growth and 
reserves. 
These models build on each other and involve increasingly 
more data for implementation. 
A SIMPLE OLIGOPOLY MODEL 
This model deals with a single commodity such as grain. 
Countries are divided into two classes: (E) net exporters of 
grain, and (I) net importers of grain. 
The basic data required for this model are (1) the aggregate 
demand curve for the net importing countries; and (2) the cost 
functions of each of the net producers. If the cost functions 
are not known, it could be assumed instead that additional pro- 
duction is costless up to a certain limit s beyond which the i ' 
country i cannot naturally produce any more. 
Let p = f(q) be the aggregate demand and c.(q.) the cost of 
1 1  
producing amount q for each of the countries iEE. The countries i 
in E can be considered as p1,aying a game in which they set their 
production levels so as to maximize net revenues. Equilibrium is 
reached when each producer's marginal net revenue is zero, that 
is, when 
* 
The equilibrium outputs q are determined from the equations: i 
j: 
all i E E  
In the following example, we illustrate the types of behaviour 
that can be analyzed using this approach. 
Consider three grain exporting countries, 1,2,3, and let each 
country i's natural production limit be si where the cost of pro- 
duction up to s are negligible. Let the demand curve for grain i 
be as shown in Figure 1. 
F i g u r e  1  
Case  A. P r o d u c t i o n  l i m i t s  ( s l ,  s2, s3) a r e  ( 6 0 , 6 0 , 6 0 )  . Then 
i n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
o u t p u t s  = ( 2 5 , 2 5 , 2 5 )  , t o t a l  o u t p u t  = 75 
r e v e n u e s  = (625 ,625 ,625)  , t o t a l  r e v e n u e  = 1875 
I n  t h i s  case t h e  c o u n t r i e s  restr ict  t h e i r  o u t p u t  t o  much less 
t h a n  t h e y  c o u l d  n a t u r a l l y  p roduce .  
Case  B. P r o d u c t i o n  l i m i t s  (s1,s2,  s ) are ( 1 0 , 6 0 , 6 0 ) .  Then 
o u t p u t s  = ( 1 0 , 3 0 , 3 0 )  , t o t a l  o u t p u t  = 70 
r e v e n u e s  = (300 ,900 ,900)  , t o t a l  r e v e n u e  = 2100 
I n  t h i s  case, c o u n t r y  1  i s  o p e r a t i n g  a t  f u l l  c a p a c i t y ,  b u t  
b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  2  and  3  rest r ic t  t h e i r  o u t p u t .  
Case C. Suppose that production limits are as in Case A but 
the countries form a coalition to monopolize the export market. 
outputs = (16 2/3, 16 2/3, 16 2/3) , total output = 50 
revenues = (533 1/3, 833 1/3, 833 1/3) , total revenue = 2500 
Compared with A, collusion results in higher revenues and much lower 
food output for consumption by the food-poor countries. 
Case D. Let production limits be as in Case B and suppose the 
two large producers collude to restrict production. Then 
outputs = (10, 22 1/2, 22 1/2) , total output = 55 
revenues = (450, 1012 1/2, 1012 1/2) , total revenue = 2475 
Case E. An important question to ask is whether some dominant 
producer can act as a "leader" and unilaterally announce a policy 
that might at first blush seem to be contrary to its self-interest, 
but that in fact leads to an improvement in its own position as well 
as in the position of the consuming countries. 
Suppose for example that country 1 (e.g. the U.S.) declares 
unilaterally that it believes in a "liberal" food policy and will 
produce (out of the goodness of its heart) 50 units. If the other 
two producers act on the belief that 1 means what it says and 
they compete, then they will find equilibrium positions as follows: 
outputs = (50, 16 2/3, 16 2/3) , total output =- 83 1/3 
revenues = (833 1/3, 277 7/9, 277 7/9) , total revenueF 13888/9 
It will be seen that by following this liberal policy, country 1 is 
actually better off than in Case A, and at the same the consuming 
nations also benefit. 
Even if the other two producers collude to restrict their output 
the result is still not unfavourable to the consuming nations,total 
output being the same as in Case A. 
outputs = (50, 12 1/2, 12 1/2) , total output = 75 
revenues = (1250, 312 1/2, 312 1/2) , total revenue = 1875 
The somewhat surprising conclusion emerges that the adoption of 
a liberal production policy by one country may actually be its best 
alternative and that it simultaneously benefits the consuming nations. 
This analysis shows how, with relatively little data, consider- 
able insight can be gained into strategic possibilities in the market. 
Other possibilities for trade and production agreements might also be 
investigated, such as for example the alliance of a particular pro- 
ducer with some subgroup of consumers to the mutual benefit of both. 
THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
The simple oligopoly model involves two strong simplifying 
assumptions. First, it assumes that there is no strategic behaviour 
on the consumption side of the world agricultural market; that is, 
consumers are represented only through an aggregate demand curve. 
Second, the previous model treats all producers as income-maximizers, 
rather than taking into account differences in national needs and 
preferences. 
We shall present two less-restricted examples, in a general 
trade equilibrium context, which illustrate how considerations such 
as acreage restrictions, food grants,and preferential trade agreements 
can be studied. For expository and computational simplicity, the 
examples involve only two commidities and two or three countries. 
However, it is clear that the observed phenomena can also be found 
in larger, econometrically-valid models. 
Consider two countries (nominally the .U. S. and Japan) . At the 
beginning of the trading season, the U.S. has initial stocks of (2,O) 
of two commodities (nominally, agricultural and non-agricultural 
goods) and Japan has stocks of (0,l). (The fact that each country 
has a "corner" on one commodity is not critical to the example, but 
it simplifies calculations). Assume that each has the same utility 
function for consumption of the two commodities as shown in Fig.2. 
In this situation it is not difficult to see that the world 
equilibrium is associated with relative prices of 1:8 and the con- 
sumption bundle of the U.S. is (2/5, 1/5) while that of Japan is 
(8/5 , 4/51 
This result is not too surprising; it reflects a situation 
in which there is an abundant supply of agricultural products. But 
what if the U.S. intentionally restricts food production (say, by 
withdrawing certain lands from production)? To be specific, let 
the U.S. restrict its production so that its initial holding is 
only 0 Now, the exchange equilibrium is at prices of 1:1, 
with final consumptions of (1/2, 1/2) for each. Observe that the 
net gain for the U.S. is positive in both commodities. 
In a starving world, it may not be politic (or moral) to re- 
strict production solely for personal gain. Could it possibly be 
to the advantage of the u.'s. to freely give some of its food in 
aid to another nation? If so, what other countries are the natural 
candidates for this aid? 
Consider the U.S. and Japan in the presence of a third country 
(say,India). Further assume that relative productions of agricultural 
goods and non-agricultural goods in the three countries are (12,0), 
(0,10) and (8,O). Further assume that, at consumption levels near 
those resulting from world trade equilibrium, the respective utility 
functions are min (4x,3y) , min (2x,6y) and min (x, 12y). (That is, the 
complementarity between agricultural and nonagricultural products 
makes additional units of industrial goods more critical than addi- 
tional units of food in the U.S; the situation is reversed for India 
(due to the large national population) and intermediate for 
Japan. The following (rather surprising) result can then be observed. 
If the U.S. freely gives some of its food to India (without restric- 
tions on the use of the gift) the resulting world trade equilibrium 
involves a sufficiently large decrease in the relative price of the 
industrial good so that the U.S. obtains an increase in utility 
(over the state of affairs at equilibrium, prior to the food grant). 
Clearly, the gift also benefits India, while Japan suffers some de- 
crease in utility. 
Conditions under which this situation can occur are quite 
general. If two nations have disparate needs (or preferences) and 
one has an exportable surplus in a commodity highly desired by the 
other, then foreign aid in the form of commodity transfers can leave 
both in a better market position. Examination of this phenomenon in 
a more elaborate economic context (including, ultimately, the general 
equilibrium determined by the FAP linking model) could shed light 
both upon existing trade agreements and upon potential national group- 
ings which might improve the lot of certain developing nations at 
no cost to their trading partners. 
The only data required for this approach, beyond the informa- 
tion already available to FAP, are the relative preferences of the 
nations for various bundles of commodities. A natural first step 
towards estimating these preferences might involve aggregating all 
agricultural products into a single good, and examining stated 
national priorities relitive to agricultural consumption, non- 
agricultural consumption and the formation of capital stocks (the 
latter, presumably, to be used for future industrial growth). A 
procedure for computing equilibrium prices and allocations must also 
be available; the programs being developed by Keyzer may be of value 
here. 
MULTI-PERIOD MODELS 
The previous models have all been static. They refer to 
decisions in a single period of time. This section is concerned 
with some problems and decisions which arise when time is taken 
into account. These new phenomena include: 
- trade-offs between consumption and investment 
in each country (which ultimately involves the 
trade-off between present and future consumption); 
- possibilities of stockpiling to smooth out (or 
accentuate) patterns of production and prices 
over time; 
- the possibility of temporarily financing imports 
out of financial resources instead of exports; 
- the increased importance of weather variability 
and political instability as unknown factors 
leading to disruption of plans; 
- the possibility of long term planning instead of 
myopic year-to-year decision making; 
- the difference between long-term and short-term 
reactions to policies of other countries (e.g. 
increasing self-sufficiency to avoid dependence 
on a single supplier, or alternatively special- 
ising where comparative advantage lies whenever 
stable supplies and markets seem assured). 
In this section we outline briefly one general model for 
handling some of these issues. The next section develops in 
more detail a relatively simple special case. 
Suppose that each country produces a specified amount of 
output of each product at the "end" of each year. It must decide 
how much of each output to send to market for export and how much 
to keep back for domestic consumption. As a result of its market 
operations it obtains a set of imports which may be used either 
for further consumption or for investments. Output in the next 
and future periods will be determined (in part) by the level of 
this investment. And so the cycle continues. This model is shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 3. 
Fig.3 Cycle of Decision for each Country 
This model focuses on two kinds of phenomena (1) the trade- 
off between consumption and investment in each country, and ( 2 )  
the decision on how much (if at all) to hold off the market in 
order to raise the ?rice. The operation of the market is modelled 
as described in the preceding sections. For example, small countries 
may take the market price as given whereas larger countries may 
consciously attempt to influence it. 
Implementation of the multi-period model would need data and/ 
or assumptions for each country concerning: 
(i) production functions of each commodity 
(ii) utility functions specifying preferences between con- 
sumption of different kinds of foods in different 
periods of time 
(iii) functions relating output or capacity in any period 
to investments in the previous period. 
It would also have to be specified how the market works and 
how decisions are made. There are basically two possibilities: 
(A) Each country is assumed to know the present and future 
situation and objectives of all other countries, so 
that an equilibrium solution can (in principle) be 
calculated embodying optimal decisions for all countries. 
(B) Each country makes guesses about the situation and 
objectives of all other countries, and uses behavioral 
rules of thumb (possibly looking only one period 
ahead) to determine its consumption and trade decisions. 
Essentially this is a simulation approach. 
In either case, computational problems would be very severe 
for large models. 
A SPECIFIC NLTI-PERIOD MODEL 
In this section we develop a model which tries to represent 
an idea put forward in conversation with F. Rabar. It seems to 
be the simplest possible way of analyzing some of the phenomena 
discussed in the preceding section. In effect, it is a special 
case of that model. It assumes (1) that production is given exo- 
genously to the model (perhaps indicated by extrapolation of 
historical data); (2) it is limited to one (agricultural) com- 
modity plus money; (3) all countries except one take the market 
price as given; (4) the market-leader sets price in anticipation 
of how the other countries will repond, then has to supply their 
net requirements (possibly by adjustments to its buffer-stock). 
This model is shown in Figure 4. 
Fig.4. Sequence of Decision for Price-Taking Countries 
To model this situation, let 
Ct = consumption of food 
Vt = investment of funds 
Xt = net exports of food (import if negative) 
Bt = financial reserves. 
The country is assumed to choose levels of these variables 
to maximise some utility function. 
subject to constraints on distribution of available output 
and distribution of funds 
and minimum levels of consumption (e.g. related to subsistence 
requirements) 
investment 
( 5 )  v > V  t -  
and financial reserves (e.g. to avoid bankruptcy, or to stay with- 
in scope of world Bank loans etc.) 
(These minimum allowable levels could thus vary over time). In the 
light of these constraints, the utility function could be quite 
simple, e.g. U = CV. 
t t  
Each of these countries is assumed to know and take as given 
market price in the current period. We assume that the market- 
leader is a price-setter. The sequence of decision is thus 
- market-leader sets price p t 
- other countries determine net exports X t 
- market-leader meets all market demands taking up 
variations via buffer-stocks. 
The market leader faces a similar problem to the one out- 
lined, with one additional consideration 
let Rt = net addition to storage of food 
St = level of buffer-stock 
Then his allocation decision is 
Stocks are updated by 
He may have a constraint on maximum buffer-stocks (e.g. non- 
negativity) 
Finally, the world market must clear, so that 
or equivalently 
where subscript i denotes the country and i = I  is the market- 
leader. 
This model is evidently of simulation type. Expectations 
about the current and future behavior of all other players must 
be fed into the model to determine individually optimal policies. 
It is also possible for learning to take place. It does not assume 
that equilibrium is reached. For example, the market necessarily 
clears but the market leader may have to export more or less than 
expected. 
In principle, it would be possible to include elements of 
uncertainty concerning weather, supplies, etc. 
The data that this model would require are: 
(i) estimates of future supplies for each country 
(ii) initial levels of financial reserves plus any 
exogenous inflows 
(iii) utility functions (i.e. objectives) 
(iv) minimum acceptable levels of consumption, invest- 
ment, financial reserves, etc. 
(v) expectations concerning (future) market behaviour 
of other countries (or at least future market 
price). 
This model would be useful chiefly for analyzing the attempts of 
small countries to escape from the "poverty" trap and the pricing 
policy of the market leader. It could probably also be adapted 
to analyze bilateral trade agreements and collusion between 
countries once the model was running. It would be straight- 
forward to use sensitivity analysis to examine the effects of 
different assumptions about production, objectives, expectations, 
etc. 
SUMMARY 
In general, game theory deals with two types of issues. It 
attempts to describe, and sometimes prescribe, the behavior of 
strategic actors in a competitive world. In addition, it studies 
the gains available through various kinds of cooperative behavior, 
and methods through which these gains might be shared. 
Clearly, both of these aspects of game theory are relevant to 
the Food and Agriculture Program at IIASA. The establishment of 
a national agricultural policy is often viewed as a primarily 
competitive problem, with the goal of increasing the welfare of 
the nations'citizens. (This goal, of course, involves such diverse 
matters as industrial growth, price stability, income distribution 
and agricultural consumption). On the other hand, the formulation 
of international agreements concerning agricultural assistance, 
trade preferences, international buffer stocks and the like, in- 
volves consideration of the advantages of cooperation. 
In the preceding pages, several preliminary suggestions are 
made concerning approaches to thegametheoretic aspects of the 
world agricultural situation. One model concerns oligopolistic 
competition between producers of agricultural goods, when their 
critical decisions are the setting of production (or buffer stock) 
levels. Examined in this context are the potential gains avail- 
able to a producer who takes a leadership role in increasing pro- 
duction. Other models are presented in a general equilibrium 
context. One of them considers the effect of production restric- 
tions on the relative prices of other commodities. Another 
illustrates the existence of natural trading partnerships, within 
which an agricultural grant from a large agricultural producer 
to a developing nation may work to the benefit of both. Finally, 
a general multi-period planning model is presented, which models 
national decisions concerning production, investment and consum~tion, 
as well as subsequent international marketing decisions. Several 
preliminary simplifications of this model are also discussed. 
This report indicates only a few of the food and agricultural 
issues to which game theory is relevant; the list of potential 
applications is far from complete. For example, there is a growing 
literature on the equitable apportionment of the costs of cooperative 
agreements. The importance of this literature to the matter of 
international buffer stock policies is clear. The study of alter- 
native methods of reduc'ing, by cooperative agreements, a nation ' s 
exposure to the risk of local climatic variation, and related issues 
concerning comparative advantage, might also be considered. 
As this report has indicated, there are many different kinds of 
models which lie within the framework of game theory. No one model 
can hope to answer every question which might be posed. Moreover, 
there are many aspects of any real-world situation which lie out- 
side the conventional boundaries of game theory. Whatever models 
are adopted, they can only provide frameworks for organizing differ- 
ent aspects of the available data, and helping to answer specific 
classes of questions. 
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